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Clear nights: 70.7% (n=110) · Overcast: 72.2% (n=193) · Adverse: 68.2% (n=300). The 4-point range across conditions is not statistically significant — Ukraine's interception rate is weather-robust.

OLS regression of night-time cloud cover against interception rate shows a near-zero relationship. Cloud cover explains less than 0.3% of variance in intercept outcomes.

Launch volumes are highest on clear nights (150.4/day) vs adverse nights (129.6/day). There is no evidence Russia times swarms to exploit poor weather conditions.

The only volume band that consistently falls below the 74% overall mean. Medium-intensity attacks — not mass salvos — are most effective at degrading performance.

At the highest attack volumes (n=10), interception recovers to 83% — above the overall mean. Mass swarms do not overwhelm Ukrainian air defence in the way commonly assumed.

The volume-to-interception relationship is non-linear. No attack nights fell into the overwhelmed category (<55%). The system appears structurally robust at both low and very high volumes.

Mixed salvos (Shahed + missile, n=497) produce a 73% interception rate vs 75% for Shahed-only (n=411). The 2-point difference is within error margins — mixed salvos do not measurably degrade overall interception.

Missile-only salvos (n=82) produce the highest interception rate at 80%, suggesting Ukraine's missile defence performs well independently of Shahed saturation.

Mixed nights use the highest mean volumes (113 weapons/night vs 101 Shahed-only). Any marginal degradation in mixed salvos likely reflects volume effects rather than a decoy function.

Up from roughly 45–50% in late 2022. The campaign has become a drone-dominant operation, with missiles representing under 10% of launches proportionally by 2025–2026.

Approximately 20× the 2022 baseline. This represents both substitution away from expensive missiles and a raw expansion of strike capacity enabled by Iranian-origin drone supply chains.

Absolute missile numbers remain significant, but their proportional role has clearly shifted — from strategic primary weapon to supplementary precision element within Shahed-dominant salvos.

After falling to a low of ~3 oblasts per attack in mid-2025, geographic reach tripled to 8+ by March 2026 — a significant shift in Russia's targeting strategy.

Kharkiv (~128) and Sumy (~115) lead by a significant margin, reflecting front-line proximity. Kyiv (~96) and Dnipropetrovsk (~98) follow as primary strategic targets.

Forcing Ukraine to maintain air defence coverage across 8+ oblasts simultaneously creates resourcing pressure that mass volume attacks on a single axis do not — a potential strategic adaptation.

Russia's Rubikon drone unit has published target breakdown statistics across 24,000+ engagements, enabling the first direct comparison of Russian and Ukrainian FPV targeting doctrine. The contrast is striking — and has prompted concern among Russian warbloggers about doctrinal mismatch.

22–30% personnel across reported periods — July 2025: 21.9% (5,134 of 23,433 targets), first half April 2026: 24.2% (4,840 of 20,022), Jun 2025–Jan 2026: 29.9% (50,238 of 168,000+). USF commander Madyar has stated a minimum 30% personnel targeting mandate.