Analyses — Ukraine War Unmanned Systems Tracker

Analysis 1 — Weather and Shahed interception rates · April 2026 · n=603 attack days

Cross-referencing 603 Shahed/Geran attack days (Oct 2022–Mar 2026) from the Petro Ivaniuk air defence dataset with night-time weather from the Open-Meteo Historical Archive API. The central question: does adverse weather degrade Ukraine's air defence performance?

Finding: ~70% consistent across all weather conditions

Clear nights: 70.7% (n=110) · Overcast: 72.2% (n=193) · Adverse: 68.2% (n=300). The 4-point range is not statistically significant. Ukraine's interception rate is weather-robust.

Finding: Cloud cover r=0.051, p=0.21 — not significant

OLS regression of night-time cloud cover against interception rate shows a near-zero relationship. Cloud cover explains less than 0.3% of variance in intercept outcomes.

Finding: Russia does not exploit adverse weather

Launch volumes are highest on clear nights (150.4/day) vs adverse nights (129.6/day). No evidence Russia times swarms to exploit poor weather conditions.

▸ METHODOLOGY

Weather for Kyiv (50.45°N, 30.52°E). Night-time = 20:00–06:00 local. Attacks with <10 Shaheds excluded. Clear = cloud cover <30%, Overcast = 30–79%, Adverse = ≥80% or precipitation. OLS regression, Pearson correlation.

Analysis 2 — Air defence saturation threshold · April 2026 · n=955 attack nights

Tests whether Ukrainian air defence degrades under high launch volumes — identifying the saturation threshold above which interception rates fall significantly.

Finding: Degradation zone is 61–150 weapons (66–67%)

The only volume band consistently below the 74% mean. Medium-intensity attacks degrade performance more than mass swarms.

Finding: 600+ weapon attacks achieve 83% interception

Above the overall mean. Mass swarms do not overwhelm Ukrainian air defence. No nights fell into the overwhelmed (<55%) category.

▸ METHODOLOGY

Volume buckets: 1–30 (n=285), 31–60 (n=153), 61–100 (n=166), 101–150 (n=153), 151–200 (n=98), 201–300 (n=36), 301–400 (n=18), 401–600 (n=36), 600+ (n=10). Classification: ≥70% manageable, 55–69% degraded, <55% overwhelmed.

Analysis 3 — Salvo composition: testing the Shahed-as-decoy hypothesis · April 2026 · n=1,060 nights

A widely cited claim holds that Russia uses Shaheds as decoys to saturate air defence and enable missile penetration. This analysis tests it directly.

Finding: Hypothesis not supported — 73% vs 75%

Mixed salvos (Shahed + missile, n=497) produce 73% interception vs 75% for Shahed-only (n=411). The 2-point difference is within error margins.

Finding: Missile-only nights achieve 80% interception

The highest interception rate of any salvo type. Ukraine's missile defence performs well independently of Shahed saturation.

Analysis 4 — Russian weapon mix evolution · April 2026 · Aug 2022–Mar 2026

Finding: Shaheds now 85–90% of launches

Up from ~45–50% in late 2022. Monthly volume reached 8,000+ by early 2026 — approximately 20× the baseline. The campaign has become drone-dominant.

Finding: Missiles declining proportionally, not in absolute terms

Under 10% proportionally by 2025–2026. The strategic emphasis has shifted to attrition via Shahed mass, with missiles reserved for high-value precision targets.

Analysis 5 — Geographic dispersion of Russian strikes · April 2026

Finding: Mean oblasts per attack tripled — ~3 to 8+ (mid-2025 to Mar 2026)

Wider geographic reach forces Ukraine to maintain air defence coverage across more regions simultaneously, creating resourcing pressure that volume attacks on a single axis do not.

Finding: Kharkiv most targeted — ~128 events

Kharkiv (~128) and Sumy (~115) lead due to front-line proximity. Kyiv (~96) and Dnipropetrovsk (~98) follow as primary strategic targets.

All analyses by Andro Mathewson, PhD Candidate in War Studies, King's College London. Data: Petro Ivaniuk / Ukrainian Air Force; Open-Meteo Historical Archive API; USF Pidrakhuyka. Code: github.com/Androm2018. Working findings — not peer-reviewed.

Original Analyses