Unmanned Systems Tracker
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Reading the data

Methodology
& Glossary

Almost every number published about this war is a claim by an interested party. This page sets out where each figure on the tracker comes from, what it counts, what it does not count, and the specific artefacts that will mislead you if you read the series without knowing about them. A glossary of unmanned systems terminology follows.

01Confidence tiers 02Counting rules 03Known artefacts 04Sources 05Data access 06Glossary
01

Confidence tiers

Figures on this tracker fall into three tiers of evidential strength. They are not interchangeable, and the single most common analytical error in drone-war reporting is summing across them. A photo-confirmed loss and a claimed strike are different kinds of object.

Tier 1 · Confirmed
Photographic or video evidence, independently catalogued. Oryx and WarSpotting only enter a loss when visual evidence exists. These figures are floors, not totals: they undercount by an unknown margin because not every loss is filmed. WarSpotting states plainly that its data does not correspond to the actual number of losses, though it approaches it. Use these to establish a minimum, never a maximum.
Tier 2 · Institutionally reported
Published by a party to the conflict through a systematic process. Ukrainian Air Force daily air defence reports, USF Pidrakhuyka strike figures verified in the DELTA system, MoD mission counts. There is a real counting process behind these, and internal consistency is usually good. They remain the claims of a belligerent with an interest in the result, and they are not externally audited.
Tier 3 · Claimed
Statements by commanders, ministries or spokespeople without an underlying published dataset. Campaign totals, milestone announcements, proportions of a fleet destroyed. Often approximately right, occasionally aspirational, and impossible to verify or reproduce. Treated on this site as directional rather than quantitative.
Why the distinction matters in practice
In July 2026 the Unmanned Systems Forces reported striking 30 Russian air defence assets. WarSpotting recorded five visually confirmed Russian air defence losses in the same month. Neither figure is wrong. They measure different things — a strike claim against a photographed loss — and the ratio between them is itself the useful number, because it gives an empirical sense of how much confirmation lags claim.

Where both a claimed and a confirmed figure exist for the same thing, this tracker aims to show both rather than reconcile them. Averaging across tiers produces a number belonging to no methodology at all.

02

Counting rules

Neutralised, not intercepted

Air defence rates on this site report neutralisation: weapons kinetically destroyed plus those suppressed by electronic warfare and lost before reaching their target. This matches how the Ukrainian Air Force reports its own headline figure, and it is the basis on which comparable trackers publish.

The distinction is not cosmetic. Counting only kinetic destruction understates the all-time rate by roughly ten percentage points, because electronic warfare accounts for a substantial and varying share of drones brought down. A rate computed on one basis cannot be compared against a rate computed on the other.

Damaged and destroyed are separate columns

USF strike figures report targets hit and, within that, targets destroyed. The two are nested, not additive: a category showing 3,675 hit and 834 destroyed means 3,675 targets were struck, of which 834 were assessed as destroyed. Summing the columns double-counts.

Monthly versus cumulative

Series labelled monthly contain that month alone. Series labelled cumulative contain everything to date. Where a source publishes a running total under a monthly heading, it is relabelled here rather than silently converted, because the conversion is not always recoverable.

Floors versus exact counts

Where a source publishes "more than 10,000" or "almost 20,000", the figure is recorded as a floor and marked as such — on charts, by a hollow rather than solid bar. Treating a floor as an exact count creates false precision and, worse, false month-to-month movement when a floor in one month is compared against an exact figure in the next.

Gaps are left empty

Months with no published figure are omitted, not interpolated. A missing point is information; an invented one is not.

Event logs are not samples

The USV and UGV logs record notable, well-sourced individual operations — firsts, capability milestones, unusually well-documented actions. They are curated, not systematic. Counting entries per month measures reporting attention, not operational tempo, and the two move independently.

03

Known artefacts

Long-running open-source datasets accumulate distortions that look like findings. These are the ones known to affect data on this site. Each has produced an apparent trend that is not real.

Reporting convention changes

Between roughly October 2024 and July 2025 the Ukrainian Air Force reported electronic warfare suppression in a field separate from kinetic destruction, then merged the two. Any series built on the destroyed field alone shows a collapse in interception through that window and a recovery afterwards. Neither happened. The apparent trend is entirely an artefact of which fields were populated when.

General principle
When a time series shows a sharp break followed by a return to trend, suspect the reporting method before the battlefield. Structural change in war is usually gradual; changes in how a ministry formats a spreadsheet are instantaneous.

Taxonomy revisions

USF revised its target categories during 2026. Categories were renamed, merged and added — copter drones became multirotor drones, robotic complexes became UGVs, and roughly a dozen new headings appeared. Category-level series do not run continuously across that break, and matching old to new categories involves judgement that would be invisible in a chart.

Retroactive correction

Territorial assessments are revised as control is clarified, often weeks later. A published monthly figure may incorporate corrections belonging to earlier months, which means the headline number for a month is not the same thing as that month's own change. Where the difference is known, it is stated alongside the figure.

Aggregation of unlike categories

Some air defence records log multiple weapon types in a single row — a strike package combining surface-to-air missiles and cruise missiles, for instance. Any filter that classifies by weapon type will attribute the whole row to whichever type it matches. Type-specific rates drawn from small samples should be read with this in mind, particularly where launch volumes are low.

Novelty bias

Unusual events are over-reported when a capability is new and under-reported once it becomes routine. The first ground robot casualty evacuation was widely covered; the ten-thousandth was not. Apparent declines in novel capabilities frequently reflect the fading of news value rather than the fading of the capability.

Confirmation as a function of drone coverage

Drone footage is now the primary confirmation mechanism for battlefield claims on both sides. This creates a circularity: strikes conducted without drone observation are less likely to be confirmed and therefore less likely to be counted at all. High drone attribution in casualty data partly reflects what can be filmed, not only what drones did.

04

Sources

Primary sources behind the datasets on this site, with what each is good for and where it stops.

Corrections
Errors in this tracker are corrected in place, and material corrections that change a published figure are noted where they occur. If you believe something here is wrong, please say so — corrections from readers are welcome and acted on. Underlying data and code are available on request.
05

Data access

Everything on the tracker is free to read, and every figure carries its source. All charts, tables and filters are open to anyone, with no account and no paywall. That is not changing.

Bulk exports of the underlying datasets are available on request. They used to download directly from each tab. They now come by email instead, for two reasons: the licence attached to this data is routinely misread, and knowing who is using the datasets makes it possible to tell people when figures are corrected — which, as the sections above make clear, happens.

What is available

How to request

Email with your name, your institution or publication, which datasets you need, and what you intend to do with them. A couple of sentences is enough. Requests from researchers, journalists, students and analysts are granted as a matter of course, normally within a few days.

[email protected]

Licence
This data is published under CC BY-NC 4.0. You may share and adapt it, including for academic and journalistic work, provided you credit the Ukraine War Unmanned Systems Tracker. Commercial use is not covered by that licence. Incorporating these datasets into a commercial product or service — including training, tuning or enriching a defence or counter-drone system — requires separate written permission. Enquiries of that kind are welcome, but they are a licensing conversation rather than a data request, and should say plainly who the company is and what the product does.

Requests to reproduce charts, cite figures, or quote the tracker in published work do not need any of this. Cite it and go ahead.

06

Glossary

Terms as used on this site and in the sources it draws on. Usage in the field is not always consistent; where a term is contested, that is noted.

FPV
First-person view
A small drone flown through a live video feed by a pilot wearing goggles, usually carrying an explosive charge and expended on impact. The dominant strike weapon of the war by volume. Cheap, short-ranged, and highly dependent on radio link quality.
Fibre-optic drone
Wire-guided FPV
An FPV trailing a spool of fibre-optic cable, typically ten to fifty kilometres long. Because it carries no radio link it cannot be jammed, which makes it the standard counter to electronic warfare. Trades range, manoeuvrability and reusability of the operating area for immunity.
Loitering munition
Sometimes "kamikaze drone"
A guided weapon that can search an area before committing to a target, destroyed in the attack. The boundary with FPV is blurred: loitering munitions are generally more autonomous and longer-endurance, but usage varies by speaker.
OWA-UAS
One-way attack UAS
Umbrella term for uncrewed aircraft expended on the target. Preferred in technical writing because it describes the flight profile without implying anything about guidance, autonomy or operator intent.
Shahed / Geran
Shahed-136, Shahed-131, Geran-2
Iranian-designed long-range one-way attack drone, now produced in Russia as the Geran series. Slow, propeller-driven, launched in large salvos against infrastructure and cities. The single largest category in Russian aerial attack data.
Gerbera
Decoy
A cheap plywood and foam Shahed lookalike, sometimes carrying a small payload or electronics. Flown alongside real strike drones to saturate radar, exhaust interceptors and map air defence positions. Counted in launch totals, which inflates raw launch figures relative to actual threat.
Interceptor drone
A drone built to shoot down other drones, usually by collision. Developed as a cost-exchange answer to Shahed salvos, where using a surface-to-air missile against a cheap airframe is economically unsustainable.
USV
Uncrewed surface vessel · МБЕК
A remotely operated boat, typically explosive-laden, used against warships, bridges and port infrastructure. Ukrainian types include Magura and Sea Baby. Increasingly used as a launch platform for other systems rather than solely as a strike weapon.
UGV
Uncrewed ground vehicle · GRS
A ground robot used for logistics resupply, casualty evacuation, mine-laying, engineering and occasionally direct assault. The overwhelming majority of missions are logistics and evacuation rather than combat, which matters when reading mission counts as a measure of combat effect.
EW
Electronic warfare
Jamming or spoofing the radio and satellite links a drone depends on. Brings drones down without destroying them, which is why interception and neutralisation are different measurements.
Neutralised
On this site, a weapon either kinetically destroyed or suppressed by electronic warfare and lost before reaching its target. The basis on which air defence rates here are calculated.
Leakage
Got through
Weapons launched minus weapons neutralised. Often more informative than the interception rate, because absolute leakage can rise while the percentage rate holds steady if launch volumes fall.
Kill zone
Grey zone, drone belt
The band either side of the front line within which movement is observed and struck by drones almost continuously. Its depth is contested and often quoted from commanders describing aspiration rather than measurement.
DELTA
Ukraine's battlefield situational awareness and reporting system. Strike and mission claims verified in DELTA carry a video confirmation requirement, which is why DELTA-sourced figures sit above commander statements in evidential terms.
Oryx standard
Visual confirmation
The convention of recording an equipment loss only where photographic or video evidence exists. Produces conservative totals that undercount real losses, and is not comparable with claimed figures.
Deep strike
Long-range strike
Attacks well beyond the front line against refineries, airbases, logistics and industry. Distinguished from tactical drone use by range, target class and the planning cycle behind it.
Attack wave
Salvo
A single co-ordinated aerial attack, usually overnight, potentially mixing drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. The unit of record in the air defence dataset: one row per wave, not per weapon.
Ballistic vs cruise
Ballistic missiles follow a high arcing trajectory and arrive fast, making them far harder to intercept and largely dependent on Patriot-class systems. Cruise missiles fly low and slow enough to be engaged by a wider range of defences. Interception rates for the two are not comparable.
Shadow fleet
Ageing, opaquely owned tankers used to move sanctioned Russian oil outside Western insurance and inspection regimes. A recurring target class in the maritime strike campaign.
Claimed vs confirmed
Claimed figures come from a party to the conflict. Confirmed figures rest on independent visual evidence. Confirmed totals are always lower and always incomplete. The gap between them is a measure of verification lag, not of dishonesty.